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Healthcare: Between a Human and a Conventional Right 
 
 
 
One of the hallmarks of human civilization is the extent to which societies take care of 
their most vulnerable members, especially the sick and disabled. Many countries have outlined 
public policies committed to providing healthcare for those who cannot provide for themselves. 
Such policies have various rationales, such as reducing suffering, providing for the least well-off, 
improving health to create fair opportunity in life, and so on. One of the most prevalent 
rationales for public healthcare policies is a human right to healthcare.  
Understanding healthcare as a universal human right demands recognizing individuals’ 
entitlements to claim healthcare resources that prevent and cure disease, ameliorate disability, 
and enhance wellbeing, regardless of their political membership or social and economic status. 
One of the most important challenges for the defenders of a human right to healthcare is the 
allocation of resources for its realization. One problem is that, as Onora O’Neill and Gopal 
Sreenivasan argue, it is not immediately clear which agents bear the correlative duties for the 
right.1 Governments are typically considered the duty bearers, but they differ vastly in their 
capacity to help those vulnerable to health setbacks and those with severe disabilities.2 At the 
extreme, a right to healthcare is out of the reach of many developing economies that struggle 
to provide the most basic services to their citizens. All governments operate under scarcity, but 
those operating under severe scarcity can be judicious in their use of public resources, yet fail 
to provide even the most basic healthcare goods and services.  
The differential ability to provide healthcare services is deployed in arguments rejecting 
the existence of a human right to health. Here is one form such argument can take: 
 
                                                          
1 Onora O’neill, “The Dark Side of Human Rights,” International Affairs 81, no. 2 (March 1, 2005): 427–39; Gopal 
Sreenivasan, “A Human Right to Health? Some Inconclusive Scepticism,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume 86, no. 1 (June 1, 2012): 239–65. 
2 Jonathan Wolff, The Human Right to Health, 1 edition (W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), 29. Strictly speaking, the 
right is borne by members of the public, and discharged through government agents acting on their behalf. For 
shorthand, though, I will simply refer to governments as duty bearers. 
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Premises: 
1. Human rights are universal.  
2. The existence of universal human rights implies the existence of agents with the 
capacity to discharge their duties towards individuals who possess human rights (the 
‘ought implies can’ condition). 
3.  If a right to healthcare were a universal human right, it would require access to 
equal treatment for holders of the right.  
4. Due to objective scarcity, many agents (countries) can provide neither access equal 
to the most developed countries, nor access to basic health services. Such inability is 
not blameworthy.  
Conclusion: 
5. Since many agents cannot discharge their duties with respect to a human right to 
healthcare, there is no human right to healthcare.  
 
Premise 4 is the most controversial of these, and has received considerable attention 
from both critics and supporters of human rights to healthcare. Sreenivasan in particular has 
deployed the scarcity constraint as a reason to reject the claim that a human right to healthcare 
exists. In a brief but important section of his article “A Human Right to Health? Some 
Inconclusive Scepticism,” Sreenivasan argues that if human rights to provision of healthcare 
services existed, then governments would be violating rights without doing anything wrong.3  
I will provide additional reasons in defense of premise 4, by showing that the challenge 
is more fundamental than even Sreenivasan allows, and justifies further skepticism for a human 
right to healthcare. Various agents tasked with providing healthcare services to those who 
possess a human right to healthcare not only face scarcity constraints, namely a lack of financial 
resources, but often a more critical shortcoming of institutional capacity, which is related to 
financial capacity, but distinct from it in ways that I will make clear. The institutions and 
infrastructure that deliver healthcare services cannot be created ex nihilo or significantly 
improved by a simple re-allocation of financial resources, and wide variation in institutional 
                                                          
3 Sreenivasan, “II—A Human Right to Health?,” 245–46. 
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capacity among states is likely to be a permanent feature of our political landscape for the 
foreseeable future.  
While all of the premises spelled out above are contestable, I will assume for the sake of 
argument the truth of premises 1 and 2, namely 1. the universality of human rights, and 2. the 
‘ought implies can’ condition. I take 3, the requirement of equal access to healthcare services or 
‘equal provision’ to be a direct implication of 1. This assumption allows me to focus the rest of 
the argument on explaining the significance of premise 4 whose truth, together with 1-3, shows 
that when doing nothing wrong violates an alleged human right, the idea that the right in 
question is a human right needs to give way. The more general principle is this: if duty-bearers 
can routinely violate a human right without doing anything wrong, the human right in question 
does not exist. It is not the implication of this argument that governments do not have 
responsibilities towards their citizens for the provision of healthcare services, only that those 
responsibilities are not best understood in terms of human rights.  
Section one will give an overview of various justifications for a human right to 
healthcare. Section two will discuss the resource and institutional capacity condition as an 
objection to the existence of a human right to healthcare. Section three will address objections 
to this argument that rely on the need to provide healthcare not at a level equal to the most 
advanced economies but a decent minimum. I show that several promising ways of specifying a 
decent minimum face serious difficulties. These specifications build on some of general 
justifications offered in section one. Section four takes up another challenge to the institutional 
capacity problem, namely the progressive realization view, and argues that if one adopts it as 
condition associated with a human right to health, one has already given up the idea of a 
human right to healthcare. Finally, I offer an alternative understanding of healthcare rights as 
legal-conventional rights enacted by communities in pursuit of distinctive goals related to 
health and equal opportunity.    
  A conventional right is a right that emerges from policies enacted by governments in 
pursuit of certain moral goals. Political communities may pursue a number of moral goals, such 
as reducing suffering, closing opportunity gaps for the disadvantaged, and preventing the 
spread of contagious diseases. In doing so they enact policies that create specific healthcare 
4 
 
entitlements for various groups of people on the basis of those goals. These entitlements will 
depend on the available institutional capacity and resources, and on trade-offs with other 
important policy goals. We need not think of these moral goals as promoting or protecting 
human rights.  
The argument fits into a broader debate about the connection between human rights 
and the requirements of social justice broadly conceived. It provides support for the position 
that human rights do not have to realize all the requirements of social justice, but can be 
limited to a subset of those requirements. John Rawls, Joel Feinberg, and Charles R. Beitz have 
all defended a version of this position.4 Although they disagree on which rights belong to the 
proper subset of human rights, they all maintain that some of the values often referred to as 
human rights are best understood as ‘aspirational’ or ‘manifesto’ rights, and that these are not 
human rights proper, but rights created by political communities in pursuit of their (often 
distinct) visions of social justice. The argument offered here substantiates this position with 
respect to the right to healthcare. 
 
I. From Human Rights to Healthcare Rights. 
 
Human rights are distinct from other rights in virtue of their universality ̶ human rights 
are rights that every human being enjoys, and their institutional independence ̶ they exist 
independently of the political and social context in which individuals find themselves. Violating 
human rights involves committing a moral wrong against the individual rights bearer.  
In Making Sense of Human Rights, James Nickel captured some of the fundamental 
features of human rights. Human rights offer  
 
basic moral guarantees that people in all countries and cultures allegedly have simply 
because they are people. Calling these guarantees "rights" suggests that they attach to 
particular individuals who can invoke them, that they are of high priority, and that 
                                                          
4 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 1st ed. (Harvard University Press, 
2001), 81; Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), 142–43; Joel Feinberg, 
Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 67. 
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compliance with them is mandatory rather than discretionary. Human rights are 
frequently held to be universal in the sense that all people have and should enjoy them, 
and to be independent in the sense that they exist and are available as standards of 
justification and criticism whether or not they are recognized and implemented by the 
legal system or officials of a country.5 
  
These features of human rights are familiar. Human rights are fundamental rights that 
people enjoy by virtue of their common humanity. This means that they are universal, timeless 
and exist independently of the particular political institutions one happens to live under. 
Human rights are claim rigths against anyone and everyone, so each person has the duty to 
respect the human rights of everyone else.  
Universality has three dimensions. First, universality applies to the subjects of rights - 
the rights holders. Every human being, without qualification, is a right holder. Second, 
universality applies to the subject of duties – the duty bearer. Every human being is under a 
duty to respect these rights. This implies capacity to discharge the duty under normal 
circumstances – ‘ought implies can.’ Third, universality applies to the kind of treatment (action 
or forbearance) that rights bearers are due and duty holders owe. All right holders are entitled 
to equal treatment, the same kinds of action or forbearance from others. 
The understanding of what is owed to the holder of a human right can change. What it is 
to respect a right to bodily integrity can change when our understanding of threats to life and 
safety evolves. For example, if technology permits me to build a device that emits sound waves 
that permanently damage your hearing, my use of that device could constitute a new kind of 
violation of your bodily integrity. Nonetheless, each human right has a stable core that is time-
invariant. Individuals in ancient Greece had a human right to freedom that included a right not 
to be enslaved – even the ones who were in fact enslaved – no less than individuals living today 
do.  
Institutional independence means that human rights exist outside of the actual 
institutional machinery of states. They offer guidance for behavior and can be claimed by right 
                                                          
5 James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 561–62. 
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holders in contexts where institutions, understood as organizations collectively authorized to 
provide goods or restore order, are not available or have collapsed. A right against being 
arbitrarily killed or enslaved can be claimed by rights holders in pre-institutional or non-
institutional settings, such as by astronauts on the moon, or by individuals living in a failed 
state. Indeed, this is the only way human rights can serve their functions of both guiding and 
evaluating behavior, by generating principles of right conduct and by helping to assess the 
extent to which individuals and institutions comply with those principles.  
Several general rationales for human rights have been put forward as the basis of a 
human right to healthcare. This (non-exclusive) list of justifications draws on the general 
functions human rights serve:  
1. rights as protectors of fundamental interests against standard threats (interest-based 
accounts);  
2. rights as protectors of human dignity (status-based accounts);  
3. rights as instruments for achieving an optimal distribution of advantages (fair 
opportunity accounts); and  
4. rights defined as principles of right treatment ‘that would be chosen by properly 
situated and motivated agents agreeing to the basic terms of their relations’ (contractarian 
accounts).6 
I will provide a brief description of these four general accounts of rights, explain how a 
human right to healthcare derives from the general accounts, and then raise some questions 
about the features that qualify it as a human right.  
 
1. Interest-based accounts. 
A well-known account of rights says that they protect fundamental interests against 
standard threats. Joel Feinberg describes interests as stakes people have in certain states of 
affairs. Not all interests are important, but some constitute ‘distinguishable components of a 
person’s wellbeing’, such as physical security, nourishment, health, and resources to pursue 
                                                          
6 This classification overlaps broadly with the one offered by Leif Wenar, “Rights,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d., <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/>. 
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one’s goals.7 Rights violations constitute important setbacks to such interests. However, not all 
setbacks to interests are rights violations. Feinberg believes that many classes of setbacks to 
interest should be excluded: those that the victim has consented to by making risky bets which 
set back one’s financial interest, or those that result from fair competition between businesses 
vying for the same customers.8 The practice of competition may result in setback to substantive 
interests, but such harm should not induce moral liability in the winner because those setbacks 
are part of a general practice that is conducive to the well-being of each participant in the 
practice.9  
 Human rights can piggyback on this general account of rights as protectors of 
fundamental interests. Violations of human rights involve invasions of an interest in bodily 
integrity, sustenance, or property. Jonathan Wolff provides the most well-developed and 
sophisticated application of this general account to a right to health, conceiving a right to 
health as a right to be protected against standard threats to health.10 Wolff defines a standard 
threat to health as a condition that ‘first, it is serious enough to count as a threat, and second, a 
solution could reasonably be expected to be in reach, either because treatment could be made 
available on a routine basis, or because the condition is widespread and urgent and there is 
every reason to think that the normal processes of scientific research would lead to a 
solution.’11 Such a right grounds both negative duties not to disable or make people sick, and 
positive duties for governments as well as other agents (pharmaceutical companies, rich 
nations, and international organizations) to protect and promote the health of others.12  
 Wolff defends a right to health, not a right to healthcare, because there are many 
determinants of health besides healthcare, such as hygiene, sanitation, nutrition, and housing. 
But he emphasizes that such a right cannot be conceived as a right to be healthy, since the 
                                                          
7 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, USA, 1987), 34. 
8 Feinberg, 42. 
9 Carmen Pavel, “Negative Duties, the WTO and the Harm Argument,” Political Studies, February 1, 2014, 6. 
10 Jonathan Wolff, “The Demands of the Human Right to Health,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86, 
no. 1 (2012): 222; Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 2 Sub (Princeton University Press, 1996). 
11 Wolff, “The Demands of the Human Right to Health,” 223. 
12 Wolff, The Human Right to Health, 18–35; Allen Buchanan, Justice and Health Care: Selected Essays, 1 edition 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 219–30; John Tasioulas and Effy Vayena, “Just Global Health: 
Integrating Human Rights and Common Goods,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, May 21, 2015), 3, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2608938. 
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‘contingencies of genetics and biology make it impossible to ensure that everyone remains 
healthy.’13 Many have rejected his radically inclusive notion of a right to health that includes all 
the determinants of health. It seems to absorb within it every other right, good, and interest 
that bears positively on our health – all rights turn out ultimately to be rights to health, making 
talk of other human rights superfluous. 14 For these reasons, and to focus the discussion, I will 
refer to a right to healthcare – a right to the provision of health-related goods and services – as 
opposed to a right to health.  
 
2. Status-based accounts.  
Status-based accounts see the role of human rights as protecting moral agency – the 
ability to form, revise and pursue conceptions of a good life   ̶ and as such they constitute a 
source of moral dignity to be protected against the interference of others. Rights to freedom of 
conscience, freedom to plan and live our lives, and freedom from physical aggression all protect 
moral agency. Variously described as protecting human standing, personhood, human dignity, 
or moral agency, human rights protect moral status.15 
A human right to healthcare can be conceived as a right that is especially important for 
protecting the physical and mental health necessary for the exercise of moral agency. 
Individuals affected by serious, crippling disease or disability, who lack support for either 
medical treatment or assistance, cannot meet the necessary conditions for either forming or 
executing a plan of life. The case for rights to welfare ‘appeals to our picture of human agency 
and argues that both life and certain supporting goods are integral to it. Life and certain 
supporting goods are necessary conditions of being autonomous and free.’16 Leisure, education 
and healthcare are among these supporting goods.  
 
                                                          
13 Wolff, “The Demands of the Human Right to Health,” 222. 
14 Tasioulas and Vayena, “Just Global Health,” 6. 
15 James Griffin, On Human Rights, 1 edition (Oxford University Press, 2009), 4, 33; Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: 
Essays on Justification and Applications, n edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983); James Nickel, 
“Human Rights,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/rights-human/. 
16 James Griffin, On Human Rights, 180. 
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3. Fair opportunity accounts. 
The third account for a human right to healthcare comes from the idea that rights create 
fair opportunities for individuals in societies with large differentials in life chances. Norman 
Daniels prefers an account of rights to healthcare tied to universal human needs, such as food, 
shelter, clothing, exercise, food and companionship, things necessary for ‘species-typical 
normal functioning.’17 Not having these needs met reduces the range of opportunities available 
for individuals to plan and live their lives.18 It is by distributing the range of services and benefits 
associated with healthcare and other goods that we preserve normal species functioning. More 
recently, Daniels has recast this argument to defend the special importance of health. Building 
on his earlier work and on Rawlsian ‘justice as fairness,’ in Just Health he argues that health, 
and consequently a right to healthcare, is especially weighty in promoting fair opportunity.19  
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress outline another version of the ‘fair 
opportunities’ argument. Political institutions are just when they compensate for lack of 
opportunity caused by misfortunes over which persons have no meaningful control. ‘When 
persons are not responsible for their disabilities,’ Beauchamp and Childress argue, ‘the fair 
opportunity rule demands that they receive help to reduce or overcome the unfortunate 
effects of life’s lottery on health.’20 Institutions must provide, maintain or restore adequate 
levels of health so that individuals can have access to the normal range of opportunities 
available to others.21  
The insertion of political institutions makes this account distinctive. For Daniels, as for 
Beauchamp and Childress, the right is articulated by reference to political institutions. For 
Daniels, a right to healthcare is supported by an interest both to be treated in a certain way and 
to create the institutions that provide such treatment: ‘if persons have a fundamental interest 
in preserving the opportunity to revise their conceptions of the good through time, then they 
                                                          
17 Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 26. 
18 Daniels, 27. 
19 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 29–78. 
20 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th edition (New York: OUP USA, 
2013), 263. 
21 Beauchamp and Childress, 271–79. 
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will have a pressing interest in maintaining normal species functioning … by establishing 
institutions, such as health-care systems, which do just that.’ 22  
This claim could be read in one of two ways. One is that there are reasons for a general 
human right to the conditions that advance fair opportunities for all, including healthcare, since 
human beings have shared features that require respect and protection. The other is that rights 
to health or healthcare follow from principles that would be chosen by properly situated and 
motivated agents agreeing to the basic terms of their political relations. On this second reading, 
Daniels’ account of the right to healthcare is indistinguishable from the contractarian account 
of rights offered by John Rawls, among others, and it is not necessarily a defense of a universal 
human right, as I will emphasize below. 
 
4. Contractarian accounts.  
For Rawls, basic rights, including rights to basic goods and liberties, are justified by 
reference to a contractarian decision mechanism. Principles of justice emerge from an original 
position, in which individuals, suitably idealized to be unaware of their economic position, 
social status, and other morally irrelevant features such as race, ethnicity, and gender, design 
institutions to govern their interactions. The decision mechanism operates according to 
principles that each party agrees are fair, and that fairness transfers to the institutions that are 
chosen within that mechanism. Although Rawls did not include healthcare in his list of primary 
goods, nor did he articulate a right to healthcare elsewhere in his theory, a right to healthcare 
can be derived either from the list of primary goods and liberties as importantly connected to 
them, or as a corollary of the principle of fair opportunity.23 Rawls’s original position only 
applied to societies that shared broadly liberal egalitarian values and had adequate resources 
to build basic just institutions, so the rights developed in the original position are not universal 
rights, but moral rights of a qualified sort appropriate to communities that share certain 
fundamental values and principles, such as a commitment to the equal worth of all human 
beings, and in the value of liberty and fair opportunity. Understood this way, they occupy an 
                                                          
22 Daniels, Just Health Care, 28. 
23 Allen E. Buchanan, “The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 13, no. 1 (1984): 
60–61. 
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intermediary position between universal human rights and conventional-legal rights, the latter 
understood as the particular protections and entitlements articulated and protected by a 
specific legal system. But one could extend Rawls’s theory to a global original position to 
generate universal human rights, a move which some of Rawls’s followers adopted, but which 
Rawls himself rejected.24 Ultimately, however, contractarian accounts are different from other 
accounts of rights because they are better understood as procedures of how to generate rights 
instead of substantive account of rights.  
Each of these distinctive accounts of rights rest on the assumption that rights serve 
some single function. But as Nicole Hassoun, Leif Wenar, and others show, we need not accept 
this assumption. Rights can serve many functions, and accepting a multi-functional account of 
rights may allow us to reconcile previously incompatible accounts of what rights are for.25 This 
insight allows us to proceed on the assumption that each of these accounts identifies an 
important function of a human right to healthcare without having to solve disagreements 
between them or show which one is ‘best.’ The rationales offered for a human right to 
healthcare are not mutually exclusive.26 
None of these different accounts of a human right to healthcare require the elimination 
of all health problems, but there are more and less capacious understandings of what such a 
right entails, and I will address both the more capacious version and the version of a human 
right to healthcare that requires the provision of a basic package of goods and services, namely 
a ‘decent minimum.’ The accounts outlined above have defended the idea that a right to 
healthcare gives rise to a claim against one’s government for the provision of healthcare 
services, such as access to medical care, treatment for disease, disability support, and end of 
life care. That governments are the main duty-bearers of a right to healthcare is far from a 
conceptual necessity. Indeed, the very idea of a human right requires that all agents, individuals 
                                                          
24 Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics 110, no. 4 (July 1, 2000): 669–96; Rawls, The Law of Peoples. 
25 Nicole Hassoun, “The Human Right to Health,” Philosophy Compass 10, no. 4 (April 1, 2015): 277; Leif Wenar, 
“The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 256–251; Tasioulas and Vayena, “Just 
Global Health,” 6. 
26 For an excellent map about recent debates about a moral right to health, see also Benedict E. Rumbold, “Review 
Article: The Moral Right to Health: A Survey of Available Conceptions,” Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 20, no. 4 (July 4, 2017): 508–28. 
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included, are duty-bearers. But individuals cannot in most typical conditions provide healthcare 
goods and services to one another, since the provision of such goods requires specialized, 
professional knowledge, large resource investments and a well-developed infrastructure. 
Understood as a right whose main duty bearers are institutional, a right to healthcare fits 
uneasily with the condition of institutional independence. If rights to healthcare are rights 
whose duty bearers are states, companies, and other organizations – as surely, they must be, 
since such rights cannot be guaranteed otherwise – then rights to healthcare cannot exist in 
pre-institutional or non-institutional settings, and are not available to stateless people or 
people living in failed states.  
Let us leave this concern aside, and let us assume with the proponents of a human right 
to healthcare that the human right to healthcare is a right against states and other agents in a 
position to provide health-related goods and services. Yet institutional capacity cannot be 
assumed. It depends on resource availability, on the gradual and nested development of 
networks of infrastructure, education, production, and distribution, and on tradeoffs with other 
policy goals. By focusing on the right to healthcare in isolation from such constraints, the 
human right approach cannot explain what kind of institutional capacity is required, namely 
what the responsibilities of the duties bearers are when it comes to providing healthcare given 
resource scarcity.  
 
II. The Institutional Capacity Condition 
 
 For there to be a human right to healthcare, governments must be able to provide those 
services that constitute their correlative duty. But the condition is not some abstract ‘ability’ to 
provide services, but the capacity to provide a specific and uniform set of services across 
different institutional settings. This condition is demanded by the universality of human rights, 
in its three dimensions: the universality of right holders, the universality of duty bearers, and 
especially the equality of treatment (action or abstention) required from the duty bearer. 
 To see why the idea of a human right to healthcare is problematic, let us start with one 
of the most authoritative statements of a human right to health, namely that of The 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Its Article 12 provides 
that ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.’ This includes a 
requirement that states ensure for all citizens ‘medical service and medical attention in the 
event of sickness.’ But many governments lack the resources to provide healthcare services to 
their citizens. For instance, in Mozambique, where GDP per capita is in the hundreds of pounds 
and health spending per person in the tens of pounds per year, and where disease is much 
more prevalent and the available infrastructure much more limited, the provision of healthcare 
at the level of the ‘highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ is an impossible 
and absurd requirement. The language of Article 12 is unfortunate, as the government of a 
developing country – even one that manages to secure some important improvements in 
health levels for its citizens – cannot be expected to achieve the ‘highest attainable standard.’ 
As John Arras and Elizabeth Fenton emphasize, this is not even a reasonable policy goal, let 
alone a human right.27 
Developing countries face severe resource constraints, in addition to institutional 
capacity limitations and shortages of trained staff and facilities to deliver health services. 
Consequently, even if such governments do everything right, allocating their resources 
appropriately to policing, national defense, and critical infrastructure, they may still be unable 
to provide their citizens with healthcare services, or services beyond a bare minimum – and 
therefore would be violating their citizens’ rights, without doing anything morally wrong.  
The problem is not one of extreme scarcity, though. The problem is scarcity itself. Even 
developed countries with sophisticated healthcare systems face limitations in satisfying their 
citizens’ health needs. Most proponents of a right to healthcare recognize that demand for 
healthcare is unlimited, so governments must make crucial rationing decisions in allocating 
limited resources toward unlimited demands for healthcare.28 Economists have long articulated 
this problem. Kenneth Arrow has pointed out that guarantees that lift the threshold of access 
to resources for everyone faces a ‘bottomless pit’ problem with dramatic consequences for 
                                                          
27 John D. Arras and Elizabeth M. Fenton, “Bioethics and Human Rights: Access to Health-Related Goods,” Hastings 
Center Report 39, no. 5 (2009): 31. 
28 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 280. 
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resource allocation: “there can easily exist medical procedures which serve to keep people 
barely alive but with little satisfaction and which are yet so expensive as to reduce the rest of 
the population to poverty.”29  Culyer and Wagstaff add that need and equality sit 
uncomfortably alongside each other in the area of healthcare provision, when individuals need 
healthcare that improves their health relative to their level of ill health, but distributing 
healthcare to attain some sort of equality of health defined by normal functioning in a society 
requires denying individuals healthcare services they need above a certain level.30 Needs 
translate into a demand for healthcare services, but the demand is in tension with the 
requirement for equal access given resource constraints. This leads Culyer and Wagstaff to 
define need, and indeed equality of access, in terms of “expenditure required to effect the 
maximum possible health improvement,” and consequently to defend an understanding of 
healthcare entitlements highly sensitive to resource constraints and the relative cost-efficiency 
of various health improvement technologies.31  
Where scarcity leads to denying treatment even for critical conditions, proponents of a 
human right to healthcare claim such denial is justified as long as the decision results from just 
or legitimate procedures.32 For example, like many other theorists, John Tasioulas and Effy 
Vayena believe that the content of the right is specified mostly through fair social-legal 
processes: ‘a fully adequate specification [of a human right to healthcare] through pure moral 
reasoning is typically unavailable; instead, a workable standard must to a significant degree be 
the product of social decision-making, whether conventional or legal.’  
Likewise, for Daniels the right to health implies ‘a socially relative array of services’ that 
is the outcome of a process of fair deliberation under reasonable resource constraints.33 
                                                          
29 Kenneth J. Arrow, review of Review of Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, by John 
Rawls, The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 9 (1973): 251. Arrow adopts this point in the context of Rawls’s maximin 
principle, which requires that a society maximizes the minimum level of resources at which individuals are likely to 
find themselves no matter what their socio-economic status is. However, the point applies more generally to 
human rights argument that seek to guarantee a certain minimal (or maximal) provision of goods. 
30 A. J Culyer and Adam Wagstaff, “Equity and Equality in Health and Health Care,” Journal of Health Economics 12, 
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Although the absence of health is interpreted as biostatistical deviation from normal species 
functioning, healthcare entitlements are meant as correctives for individuals achieving the 
normal range of opportunities available in a given society. The normal range of opportunities 
are society-relative, and thus healthcare entitlements are society-relative as well.34 This 
understanding of a human right to healthcare moves Daniels away from universal human rights, 
as it denies the ‘universality of treatment’ condition, namely the idea that a universal human 
right entitles individuals to equal access to healthcare services, regardless of the institutional 
capacities of their own country. 
Focusing on procedures may be the right way to think about allocating scarce resources, 
but it does not assuage worries that the universality of the right is compromised when rationing 
involves variability of services within the same country or between different countries. Health 
officials will need to decide who is entitled to receive care, for what condition, when not 
everyone can receive care, even when care is a matter of life and death. The relativity of this 
procedural account of the content of human rights means that individuals will be entitled to 
completely different health services both across and within nations. Even in a developed 
country, rationing will make it difficult, if not impossible, for every individual to receive the 
same level of services or care. The universality of human rights requires equality of treatment, 
but rationing precludes it.35  
Faced with this challenge, Daniels may deny that he is defending a human right to 
health. He may simply argue that he is defending a moral right derived from a contractarian 
decision procedure very much in the Rawlsian spirit that is decidedly non-universal, requiring 
among others, the presence of certain favorable conditions such as the absence of severe 
material deprivation, a relatively developed system of public institutions whose role is to 
implement the society-specific conception of justice, and a modicum of shared norms of 
                                                          
34 Daniels, Just Health, 58–61. 
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fairness and equality on which such a conception of justice can be built. Thus, Daniels may 
brush off concerns with equal access to treatment as a condition of the existence of a human 
right to healthcare by denying that a human right to healthcare is what he defends. If this is the 
case, Daniels’s view shares much more in common with the view I defend in the final section of 
the article. 
But Tasioulas and Vayena, as well as other proponents of a human right to healthcare, 
will hold steadfast onto an account of this right that is socially and institutionally relative. And 
they have thoughtfully considered all the problems related to rationing and specification that 
lead to the relativization of the right to healthcare to the social, political, and economic 
conditions available in different countries. But they deny that the indeterminacy of the content 
of such a right and the variability of care should lead us to question the very existence of a 
human right to healthcare. Developed countries like the UK have procedures for determining 
when a drug that is safe and effective provides sufficient health benefits to be prescribed to 
patients as part of their healthcare services underwritten by the government. Some drugs do 
not provide enough health gains measured in adjusted quality of life years (QALYS) to justify the 
expense.36 This strikes Wolff and others as an ‘an appropriate, if not entirely uncontroversial, 
way of allocating resources,’ even when the result is that people who need lifesaving treatment 
are denied it.37 
This problem has also been addressed in the courts, as Wolff shows. In the South African 
case Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, the plaintiff, a person with acute kidney failure, 
brought suit against a state hospital that denied him dialysis treatment, arguing that the 
hospital violated his human right to life and health, both guaranteed by the South African 
constitution.38 The hospital had a limited number of dialysis machines, and following an 
allocation procedure, it denied Soobramoney access to treatment. The constitutional court 
argued that as long as a fair procedure had been followed, his rights were not violated. Wolff 
cites the decision approvingly, although he characterizes the situation as a tragic conflict of 
                                                          
36 Wolff, “The Demands of the Human Right to Health,” 227–29; James Wilson, “The Right to Public Health,” 
Journal of Medical Ethics 42, no. 6 (June 1, 2016): 372–73. 
37 Wolff, “The Demands of the Human Right to Health,” 228. 
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rights, implying that perhaps this kind of situation is uncommon and extraordinary.39 But of 
course it isn’t. All decisions involving allocation of resources for healthcare have costs, and 
therefore require prioritization and, consequently, rationing. Hospital medical boards and 
national health officials are confronted with them every time they make rationing decisions, 
namely all the time. A new drug to treat a particular disease might mean fewer beds in the 
neonatal intensive care unit, or just as dangerous to health and wellbeing, fewer fire crews or 
fewer police units. Because every allocation has opportunity costs, every allocation has 
precisely the features of this case. That is regrettable, but it is not unjust. 
Proponents of a human right to healthcare conceal this problem when they the focus on 
that right in isolation from its costs in other forgone goods, even those to which persons may 
also have rights. The result is a search for a maximal level of healthcare, rather than an optimal 
level given tradeoffs between healthcare and other sorts of goods. Thinking of the right to 
healthcare as a human right implies that any tradeoff that reduces the share of resources 
allocated to healthcare is a rights violation. 
For Mozambique, whose GDP per capital is in the hundreds of pounds and health 
spending per person in the tens of pounds per year, where disease is much more prevalent and 
the available infrastructure much more limited, the provision of healthcare at the level of the 
UK is simply not possible. Gopal Sreenivasan has articulated this point as a reductio of the idea 
that individuals have claim rights to health. Indeed, he has used precisely the example of 
Mozambique to show that countries can be entirely ‘faultless’ in their failure to provide 
healthcare services that meet their citizens’ human rights.40  
  Defenders of a human right to healthcare warn, as Wolff does, that focusing on 
resource scarcity and its necessary counterpart, cost-benefit analysis, blinds us to ways that 
drug companies themselves and the international community might make treatments more 
accessible. The prices of goods and services in the healthcare sector should not be taken for 
granted, since resources can be shifted to countries with urgent healthcare needs, incentives 
can be provided for private manufacturers to lower their costs or cross-subsidize lower prices in 
                                                          
39 Wolff, 229. 
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developing countries with higher prices in developed countries, and so on. Cost-effectiveness in 
such settings is ‘itself a problem,’ Wolff claims.41 Yet cost-benefit analysis is both necessary and 
unavoidable. Ignoring costs means ignoring the adverse consequences on others of decisions 
made in the course of allocating healthcare goods. Costs are not only measured in terms of 
monetary resources spent, but in terms of the sacrifices imposed on others, as heath 
economists Alan Williams has argued.42 So the problem is not cost-benefit analysis as such, but 
better and worse ways of engaging in it.   
Outside resources will help at the margins, even in countries such as Mozambique, by 
making a difference to the number of those who can gain access to lifesaving treatment for 
AIDS or malaria. But additional spending by foreign governments or drug companies will never 
create a healthcare economy which supplies the producers (doctors, nurses and other trained 
staff), facilities (hospitals and clinics) and infrastructure (supply and delivery chains, 
communications and transport networks) needed to deliver healthcare goods and services. 
Indeed, even if the amount of outside monetary resources was unlimited, the problem of 
institutional capacity could not be resolved, because it will depend largely on the structure and 
health of the overall internal economy, sustained by social, political and cultural institutions, 
whose quality and capacity will continue to vary greatly from country to country.  
International assistance has mitigated some of the significant deficiencies of developing 
countries in the health service provision area. International organizations, NGOs, 
pharmaceutical companies, wealthy nations, big private donors have been involved for more 
than six decades in extensive efforts to provide clean water, vaccines, bed nets to protect 
against malaria, de-worming medication, tuberculosis and AIDS treatment and prevention, and 
neo-natal care, to name just a few.  And there have been some notable successes, including, 
the reduction of polio incidence, a disease that affected people in 125 countries in the early 
1980s, and irreversibly paralyzed close to 300000 people a year, mostly children. Nowadays 
more than 99% of the disease has been eradicated, in a global push remarkable for the 
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determination and creativity of its architects.43 But the reason that this counts as an 
outstanding success, despite being a single-focus operation that involved countless health 
providers on multiple continents, national governments in dozens of countries, the World 
Health Organization, United Nations Fund for Children, the United States Center for Disease 
Prevention, Rotary International and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, spanning more 
than three decades, is that it makes a bold contrast with prolonged failures of outside 
assistance to deliver on healthcare provision to the most deprived regions of the world. The 
successes must be celebrated and sustained with continued effort and resource commitments, 
but they represent an incredibly narrow victory given the benchmarks set by considering 
healthcare as a human right.  
The main reason for the lack of success of outside efforts is not only and not even 
primarily lack of resources. It is the fact that outsiders cannot make up for the very poor 
infrastructure of health services, lack of political stability, low levels of education or no 
education infrastructure for healthcare professionals, lack of markets in healthcare goods and 
services, cultural and social norms that support local uptake of healthcare services even when 
available for free, and more general infrastructure deficiencies such as lack of accessible roads 
or electricity.44 Thus, treating healthcare services as a human right is not primarily a problem of 
resource scarcity, but one of institutional capacity. The reason why this is primarily a problem 
of institutional capacity is that even with unlimited monetary resources and good will, it is 
difficult to see how outsiders could fix the institutional capacity problem. The international 
community cannot and perhaps should not intervene to build institutional capacity from 
scratch in countries that lack it.45  
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Variable institutional capacity results in the social relativity of healthcare, which belies 
the claim that ‘certainly, people have a human right to such things as access to a healthy diet 
and treatment for obesity’.46 It cannot be the case that human beings have rights to very 
specific services that their governments are not in a position to provide due to decisions made 
in accordance with just procedures. Even in relatively well-off countries such as the UK or 
Canada, promoting a healthy diet and obesity treatment might be considered below the 
priories set by rationing boards for treating disease and reducing the impact of disability on 
individual’s opportunities. The same could be said about Wolff’s blanket statement that 
individuals dying from AIDS in Zimbabwe have their human rights violated, when according to 
Wolff’s own procedural account of human rights, it is perfectly legitimate for governments to 
deny treatment to individuals when rationing prevents meeting everyone’s health needs.47 As 
Gopal Sreenivasan points out, it is ‘at once compulsory and indefensible to conclude that the 
state of Mozambique [or Zimbabwe] is infringing its citizens’ moral human right to health.’48 But 
human rights cannot go unfulfilled. Indeed, the idea that human rights are rights, means that 
individuals have claims on others for their fulfillment, and non-fulfilment counts as a rights 
violation. Due to objective scarcity and institutional capacity constraints, many countries can 
provide neither access equal to the most developed countries, nor access to basic health 
services. Since many agents cannot discharge their duties with respect to a human right to 
healthcare, there is no human right to healthcare. 
The lack of resources in developing countries and rationing in developed countries is not 
just an issue of variability of treatment. It brings out a more general problem for a human right 
to healthcare, which is the lack of a benchmark by which we can measure whether this 
indeterminate right is either violated or respected. Perhaps one can claim on behalf of the right 
bearer that the right is violated in the absence of any service provision whatsoever, and one 
can assume that there are degrees of respecting the right, but it is hard to see what it would 
mean to fully and meaningfully respect the right. Is providing some minimal (truly 
inconsequential) health services to all consistent with respecting a moral right to healthcare? 
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Or does this count as violating most (but not all) of the moral right to healthcare? When is a 
moral right to healthcare fulfilled/not violated at all?49 
The next few sections will engage some common answers to these questions that seek 
to deal with the problem of indeterminacy. What we have ruled out so far is the idea that a 
human right to healthcare requires a level of healthcare provision that meets the standards of 
the most developed countries. And clearly, even the most developed states cannot afford to 
spend to attain the highest achievable standard of mental and physical health. The more 
general point is that given the social relativity of a right to healthcare, it is at best unclear what 
is gained by claiming that individuals are due healthcare as a human right. A human right 
understood in socially and institutionally relative terms is devoid of both content and guidance 
for the behavior of individuals and institutions, and cannot serve as a yardstick for measuring 
conformity with moral standards. It ceases to be a human right at all. 
 
III. The Decent Minimum Guarantee Response 
 
Some might believe that variability in institutional capacity is a problem for a human 
right to healthcare only if one assumes high universal equal access. Instead, a universal human 
right might require the guarantee of a decent minimum of healthcare for everyone. Yet 
variability in institutional capacity is a problem for a decent minimum as well as for high equal 
access. I will show why a decent minimum, however understood, is difficult to guarantee even 
for the most developed economies, and therefore it will be especially difficult to guarantee for 
countries with severe resource and institutional capacity limitations. To see why this is so, we 
must first specify what a decent minimum requires. A decent minimum might (1) guarantee 
protections against standard threats to health, (2) reduce opportunity gaps generated by 
diseases which are outside of individual control, or (3) protect the minimal conditions necessary 
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to exercise moral agency with respect to forming and pursuing a normal range of plans of life. 
These are the best available specifications of a ‘decent minimum’ given the justifications of 
rights discussed in section one, and the problem with all of them is that the commitments they 
require are not ‘minimal’ at all.  
Let us start with (1), namely standard threats to health that are the most prevalent 
today. For instance, the top 10 causes of death in the United States (U.S.) are heart disease, 
cancer, chronic lower respiratory disease, accidents, stroke, Alzheimer’s disease, diabetes, 
influenza and pneumonia, kidney disease and suicide.50 Proponents of a decent minimum vastly 
underestimate both the prevalence and the cost of managing these conditions. A quick perusal 
of the list reveals that if a decent minimum includes, in addition to routine medical care, 
treatments for these conditions, any decent minimum is going to involve a very high 
commitment of resources. Cancer, diabetes, and kidney disease require high cost medical 
treatments, some of the newest and most expensive drugs and technologies, highly trained 
specialist care, and a medical system with the capacity to deliver those services. In 2010 in the 
U.S. the cost of cardiovascular disease alone – including heart conditions, stroke, peripheral 
artery disease and high blood pressure – was about $444 billion in combined private and public 
spending,51 equivalent to 12% of the entire US federal budget for the year.52 It is likely that 
adding up the cost of treatment for all the other conditions will equal or surpass the yearly 
budget.  
Assume now that the point of the decent minimum is (2) to ensure protections only for 
conditions over which individuals have no control. Many cancers, as well as kidney disease and 
Alzheimer’s disease fall into this category. Cancer, the second leading cause of death, is 
estimated to have cost $78 billion in 2013 in the US.53 Alzheimer’s disease, a major source of 
disability later in life, is estimated to affect 1 in 9 Americans over 65, to cost per year of care per 
patient between $27,700 and $47,000, and to have a total cost of care over $230 billion in 
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2016.54 One in 10 American adults has some type of chronic kidney disease, a number 
consistent with global figures for the prevalence of the disease.55 End stage renal disease alone 
cost $40 billion in 2009 in private and public spending, about 1% of the US federal budget for 
the year.56 
Fighting just the three deadliest diseases in the US costs approximately the equivalent of 
17%-20% of the US federal budget. The decent minimum will of course be even higher if it 
includes responding to the other standard threats to health as well. Total healthcare spending 
in the US surpassed $3 trillion (in private and public spending) in 2014, almost equal to the 
whole federal budget.57 There is no limit to the amount that might be spent on public provision 
of healthcare, and such amounts cannot be due to people as a human right.  
These may be considered unreliable estimates, since the costs of medical care in the US 
is among the highest in the world. Skeptics will point out that other developed nations, such as 
the UK or France have lower levels of spending and achieve similar or better results. Developing 
nations such as Cuba are understood to have good health outcomes with much less spent on 
medical care than the US, due to a stronger emphasis on preventative care than disease 
treatment. But it is also true that Cuba reaches these outcome with an intrusive health policy 
that would be unacceptable in western liberal democracies: yearly health checks for the whole 
family rely on compulsory house visits, doctors and nurses take detailed notes on the state of 
individuals’ homes and living conditions.58  
Additionally, the US has close to five times the population of France or the UK, and a 
higher burden of disease.59 As percentages of GDP, US, UK, and France have very similar public 
health expenditures. In 2014, France has spent 9% of its budget, the UK 7.6% and the US 
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8.3%.60 The costs are likely to be large and unaffordable for any country that tries to guarantee 
the basic minimum understood as the protection against the deadliest diseases, many of which 
require high-tech treatment and the newest, most expensive medications.  
But why not define the decent minimum as the best level of funded healthcare available 
to all citizens that a country can afford given available resources? Countries like the United 
States spend an average of $9400 per capita per year on health-related services in public 
spending alone, while Namibia spends an average of $500, and Mozambique $50.61 If those 
amounts are the best these countries can do given their resource differentials, then we can 
count that as the decent minimum. We can leave aside for now the fact that these figures 
include all public health spending, not just spending on the services that protect against the 
standard threats to health. There are several problems with this view. First, it is not clear how 
we can justify that an American is owed $9400 as a human right to healthcare resources but a 
Namibian only $500. We are clearly giving up that universal human rights require equality of 
access that country with differential resource and institutional capacity endowments cannot 
guarantee in virtue of their differences. Second, and more important, it seems we are merely 
saying that whatever countries already commit to healthcare services is what they owe to their 
citizens as a matter of a human right to healthcare. The right to healthcare loses the capacity to 
guide and evaluate the choices that governments make in order to fulfill the rights of their 
citizens. 
But perhaps the way to think about a decent minimum is not in terms of protections 
against standard threats, or compensating for a lack of opportunities that is not in one’s 
control, but (3) as a way to protect the minimal conditions of moral agency for planning and 
executing a normal range of plans of life. The guarantees that any society can provide will 
depend, in addition to its available resources and institutional capacities, on other contextual 
factors such as what is considered a normal range of plans in that society, and what 
discrepancies there are between various groups in their abilities to make and execute plans 
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that fall within the normal range. If the gap between those with serious health challenges and 
those relatively healthy is big, it may be that most resources will be devoted to closing the gap, 
after which relatively little will be available to ensure anyone else’s access in that society to a 
decent minimum of health services.62 Or it may be that resources will be devoted to those most 
likely to need time and resources to form and execute their plans of life, such as the young 
versus those at the end of their lives, an extremely unpalatable implication.63 This may mean 
that in societies with large gaps in health among different groups, healthcare services and 
goods will be available to protect the condition of exercising moral agency only for the most 
disadvantaged, while many if not most in those societies can have no or very limited claims to 
health services. 
However we specify a decent minimum of healthcare as a universal right, it becomes 
difficult to see how even the most advanced, resource rich democracies might guarantee a 
decent minimum for all their citizens. We need not linger over the situation of developing 
countries too long to realize that the challenges for them are magnified manifold. 
 
IV. The Progressive Realization Response 
 
My claim so far is that the resource allocation and institutional capacity problems have 
far-reaching implications for the defensibility of a human right to healthcare and that specifying 
a decent minimum is not likely to help overcome it. Some philosophers respond to the resource 
allocation problem by arguing that we should understand a human right to health in 
aspirational terms. They adopt the position of some international human rights documents, 
which claim that even if a human right cannot be fulfilled now, governments should aim to 
satisfy healthcare demands to the best of their abilities, while keeping full realization in mind as 
an ultimate goal. This is commonly referred to as ‘progressive realization,’ and it serves to 
acknowledge the problem of resource scarcity while keeping states committed to the 
realization of the human rights in question as a long-term goal.  
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 The idea is borrowed from the language of the General Comment 14 of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, which replaced the idea of the full realization of rights 
with the idea of ‘progressive realization.’ Accepting that there may be legitimate reasons why 
states may not be able to protect its citizens’ right to health due to resource constraints, it 
nonetheless insists that they have obligations to take ‘deliberate concrete and targeted [steps] 
towards the full realization of the right to health. While noticing some of the additional 
problems of indeterminacy with such approach, Wolff for example supports the idea of 
progressive realization.64 
Yet by making human rights dependent on future and uncertain resource availability, 
progressive realization view gives up an essential idea: that we have human rights to healthcare 
now, that they are universal, and that they accrue to all human beings regardless of what 
political community they belong to and what resources are available locally. In other words, 
progressive realization can only work as a new understanding of a human right to health if we 
give up the features that make it a human right to begin with. This new understanding 
abandons the idea that human rights generate entitlements that allow people to make claims 
on others, which create obligations to respect those rights, and which entitle rights bearers to 
hold violators responsible and ask for reparatory action if those obligations are violated. As 
Onora O’Neill aptly puts it,  
 
“If we take rights seriously and see them as normative rather than aspirational, we must 
take obligations seriously. If on the other hand we opt for a merely aspirational view, 
the costs are high. For then we would also have to accept that where human rights are 
unmet there is no breach of obligation, nobody at fault, nobody who can be held to 
account, nobody to blame and nobody who owes redress. We would in effect have to 
accept that human rights claims are not real claims.”65 
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O’Neill does not say that there is anything wrong with adopting this aspirational or 
manifesto view of human rights. What she says is rather that this is a new and radically revised 
understanding of the notion of a human right, and it ceases to have much in common with 
ordinary understandings of rights. It would appear we can justify a human right to health only 
of we re-interpret from the ground up what a human right is. We are saving human rights to 
healthcare by giving up what makes them human rights in the first place. 
The progressive realization view would seem to deprive international law of critical 
leverage in evaluating particular countries’ efforts to provide healthcare services for their 
citizens. But this would not be entirely accurate. This leverage would remain in place at least in 
situations in which countries make voluntary, specific commitments to public health goals, and 
international treaties could set up monitoring and enforcement to make sure countries do not 
backtrack on their commitments.  The processes of international law also have value for 
encouraging countries to undertake such commitments in the first place, by raising the stakes 
of public accountability, and by giving tools to local activists and citizens to pressure their 
government to give weight to healthcare provision as part of a larger set of social policies, 
especially when governments approach such provision in bad faith. But international law is not 
only important in keeping countries on track with their promises for positive provision of 
healthcare goods and services, but also in monitoring compliance with legal obligations 
imposing negative duties not to disable or make people sick. These duties have a longer history 
and are better established in a variety of international treaties which do not focus strictly on 
social rights.  
Yet is remains true that the progressive realization view demands little for the here and 
now, and it requires the abandoning of a central feature of human rights, namely its ability to 
generate claims against others. Moreover, the uncertainty related to the future availability of 
resources means that in some cases, resources for satisfying healthcare claims might never 
become available. Economic progress and the building of institutional capacity on which it 
depends is not guaranteed to be linear nor progressive and it will remain uneven across the 
world, with the prospect that some countries will remain unable to fulfil their citizens most 
basic health needs. This will be true even if they do their best to provide as many resources as 
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possible toward healthcare. It would be wrong under these circumstances to say at any point 
that these countries violate their citizen’s human right to healthcare. We cannot make sense of 
the idea that individuals living in these unfavorable conditions have a human right to health. 
Thus, the progressive realization view is much closer to what we would call healthcare as a 
policy goal than healthcare as a human right view. I will elaborate on this alternative next. 
 
V. Healthcare as Legal-Conventional Right. 
 
The alternative to a human right to healthcare is a legal-political right to healthcare. By 
legal-conventional right, or conventional right for short, I mean a right that becomes 
operational once the government becomes statutorily committed to providing a certain service 
or good to some or all of its population. To take a simple example, governments adopt 
legislation that create providers of postal services with specific responsibilities towards their 
citizens, such as the idea that all citizens should have access to postal services. Once 
governments create postal service through a law generating obligations for mail companies to 
provide a certain range of services, they acquire duties toward their citizens, and the latter have 
a claim against the government in case of non-performance. The same is true of many public 
services directed at specific groups, including housing, healthcare, and disability benefits.   
That governments have certain duties to provide healthcare and other services to their 
citizens does not entail that citizens have prior rights to these services. While rights are 
certainly sources of duties, not all duties emerge from rights. Indeed, as Benedict E Rumbold 
explained recently, “the existence of, say, an obligation on society to provide health care to the 
population, need not imply the population has a right to such care, and rejecting the right to 
health does not necessarily imply society does not have an obligation to care for the sick.”66 
Conventional rights of the kind I describe here indeed emerge from duties that government 
adopt, rather than the other way around. The guiding principle is that all citizens are at liberty 
to seek means of provision for goods and services they need, to join with others in doing so and 
to appoint public functionaries to provide those goods and services. No human right to public 
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provision must accompany a policy that creates healthcare services, but they are provided 
publicly, and the condition of their provisions are specified, each member of the designated 
public specified in accordance with those conditions has a claim not to be excluded from access 
to that service, as well as claims of specific performance against public functionaries. 
Conventional rights are rights that depend on membership in political communities, and 
are rights against specific institutions or political agents that have a statutory duty to promote 
and enforce them. As such, they are not rights that are invariable across time and space, or that 
hold against anyone and everyone. Conventional rights are more akin to rights that grow out of 
contracts, than to moral rights, even if in this case the contracting parties are the citizens on the 
one hand and the political institutions on the other. Contracts create rights between parties for 
the performance of the acts to which the parties have committed by contract. Just as contracts 
create rights and duties for contracting parties, so too legislation creates rights and obligations 
for citizens and officials respectively. The authority of governments to create and enforce 
political rights may be based in large part on the moral rights we all have, but the moral rights 
that justify government authority and the conventional rights that governments articulate on 
the basis of that authority can be different and can serve distinct functions.  
 Based on this distinction, I maintain that healthcare is a conventional and not a human 
right. If it is the case, as most proponents of a human right to healthcare claim, that ‘concrete 
rights to health-related goods will thus depend on particular institutions within particular 
socioeconomic contexts, and will have to respond to varying degrees of scarcity and different 
priorities in different states,’ then a human right to healthcare turns out to do no work at all.67 
The human right approach posits an ideal of healthcare provision and asks, ‘How do we get 
there from here?’ That gets it precisely backwards: we first need to understand what we can 
do, and then prioritize among the available options. Of course, the human right approach might 
be saved with enough qualifications to bring it in line with that perspective, but that is to say 
that the only hope for that approach is to change into the conventional right approach, focusing 
on what is feasible and at what cost, and understanding any right to healthcare as emerging 
from that focus. 
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States may have a range of good reasons to adopt healthcare as a conventional right. 
Among those reasons are promoting the general well-being of the population, offering a 
scheme of social protection for the least well-off and disabled to equalize their life chances, 
reducing suffering, preventing the spread of contagious disease as a measure of public safety 
and so on. These reasons may even translate into high priority goals, such as the goal to provide 
sanitation, clean water or protection against communicable diseases. However highly 
prioritized those goals are, though, the reasons underwriting them are distinct from any general 
human right to healthcare, and do not depend on the existence of such a right to function as 
justifications for a government’s commitment to provide healthcare to some or all of its people.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Human rights make certain behaviors mandatory. The idea of mandatory behavior 
carries the implication that the agent responsible (individual or institution) is capable, under 
normal circumstances, of discharging its duty. But many governments are not in a position to 
secure the rights of healthcare for their citizens, whether this right is understood as high equal 
protection or an equal decent minimum. Therefore, rights to healthcare are best understood as 
conventional rights, articulated in each political community based on its priorities and available 
resources, that protect those most vulnerable to sickness, disability and suffering, and that 
secure to the extent possible a normal range of functioning for all. 
